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CONFERENCE G2PKJAKC 1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK 2 3 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 4 15 CR 727 (JSR) V. 5 LILIAN JAKACKI, MARCIN JAKACKI, MW&W GLOBAL 6 ENTERPRISES, INC., EUROPEAN APOTHECARY, INC., ROBERT 7 CYBULSKI, Defendants. 8 9 10 New York, N.Y. February 25, 2016 11 2:10 p.m. 12 Before: 13 HON. JED S. RAKOFF, 14 District Judge 15 16 **APPEARANCES** 17 PREET BHARARA, United States Attorney for the 18 Southern District of New York SIDHARDHA KAMARAJU 19 LOUIS PELLEGRINO 20 Assistant United States Attorneys 21 ADAM PERLMUTTER Attorney for Defendants Lilian Jakacki, MW&W Global 22 Enterprises, Inc. and European Apothecary, Inc. LINDSAY A. LEWIS 23 WHITNEY G. SCHLIMBACH 24 Attorneys for Defendant Marcin Jakacki 25 JOHN RAPAWY Attorney for Defendant Robert Cybulski

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THE DEPUTY CLERK: It is February 25th, 2016. This is United States versus Jakacki, et al., Docket No. 15 CR 727, defendants 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5. Will everyone please be seated and will the parties please identify themselves for the record.

MR. KAMARAJU: Good afternoon, your Honor. Sidhardha Kamaraju and Louis Pellegrino, on behalf of the government.

THE COURT: Good afternoon.

MR. PELLEGRINO: Good afternoon.

MS. LEWIS: Good afternoon, your Honor. Lindsay Lewis, on behalf of Marcin Jakacki, and with me is Whitney Schlimbach, same office.

MR. RAPAWY: Appearing for the defendant Mr. Robert Cybulski, who's standing to my right, John Rapawy. Good afternoon, your Honor.

THE COURT: Good afternoon.

MS. LEWIS: I'd just like to add, your Honor, I'm under the impression from Lilian Wieckowski that her attorney, Adam Perlmutter, may have thought the conference was at 4:30 today. So I've tried to contact him; I was just out in the hall trying to reach him.

THE COURT: Well, we'll proceed and hopefully he'll show up by 4:30, but everyone else knew this was for 4:00 o'clock so I'm not sure why he did you not, but in any event, we'll go forward.

A number of motions have been filed. I wanted to get

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what the government's position is on the suppression motion.

MR. KAMARAJU: Your Honor, the government's view of the suppression motion, actually, is likely moot because this is one of those iPhone 6s that has sort of been in the news recently; we're not able to access it in any event, so there's no evidence to be suppressed.

To the extent there were any evidence, we think that the suppression motion would fail. The defense --

THE COURT: But here's the point: You can't leave your adversary hanging. Either you have to represent that you are not going to be introducing that evidence, in which case it's all moot, or if you think there's even a possibility that you're going to introduce it, then we either have to have a suppression hearing or if you think it can be disposed of by a briefing, we'll set a briefing schedule.

So which of those possibilities do you want to elect? MR. KAMARAJU: We don't believe we're going to be able to get into the phone, so we won't use the --

THE COURT: You won't use the evidence. Okay, so that motion is in effect granted but for the reason that the evidence will not be used.

Now, there was a motion for a severance. What's the government's view of that?

MR. KAMARAJU: The government thinks that that motion should be denied, your Honor.

THE COURT: Because?

MR. KAMARAJU: For several reasons. One, the policy, generally, of trying defendants together, particularly when they're indicted and, as in this case, are charged with a common cause or conspiracy, I think, favors or counsels in favor of denying the motion for severance, in particular, I think the arguments that Mr. Cybulski has raised, specifically, that there would be evidence that he believes may be prejudicial to him and that he bears some lower level of culpability, and, third, that he is not charged in particular crimes none of those warrant severance.

First, with respect to the evidence: Mr. Cybulski is charged in a common narcotics conspiracy, as your Honor is aware, with both Lilian and Marcin Jakacki. As with any normal narcotics conspiracy, evidence of the conspiracy broadly and of his coconspirators' action would be admissible against him even if he had a separate trial. So, the concept of spillover prejudice from those aspects of the government's case, I think, can be disposed of readily.

Then with respect to varying layers of culpability, the Second Circuit has recognized that that alone is not sufficient to warrant severance because inevitably in a multidefendant trial you're going to have varying levels of culpability. And in this case, as is alleged in the indictment, while the Jakackis may have been sort of the

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suppliers, as in any narcotics conspiracy, you need suppliers and you need purchasers and distributors. And Mr. Cybulski is alleged to have been one of, if not, the largest of the purchasers, so we don't think as -- you're not trying the Chapo Guzman with a courier on the street; we're trying members of the conspiracy who are all within the same ballpark of culpability and so we don't think there's an issue there with respect to sort of any prejudice flowing from that.

Finally -- and this is a point that defense counsel made in their motion -- the fact that the Jakackis, and in particular Lilian Jakacki, is charged with some crime such as Medicare or health care benefits fraud, that Mr. Cybulski is not, that also is not a basis for severance. In particular, the Court can cure any potential prejudice with an instruction by, one, obviously going through the various counts, as I know your Honor will, and directing the jury that they are to consider the defendants' guilt individually and the evidence with respect to each defendant individually. So we don't think the fact that there's a charge against one defendant that's not brought against another warrants severance. If it did, there would be any number of trials that could not be conducted together.

So, for those reasons, the government doesn't think there's a basis to sever, particularly in light of the well-established preference to try defendants charged with

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common crimes in the same trial.

THE COURT: All right, anything defense counsel wanted to say on that issue?

MR. RAPAWY: No, your Honor. I'll rely on what I put in my papers. I just thought that the really interesting issue, your Honor, is something that, a lot of times as defense counsel we have to speculate as to what a potential prejudice In this case, a few days before the motion was due, would be. Mr. Cybulski called me up in a panic because he had gone to his local pharmacy and he tried to fill a prescription and the pharmacist said that he was denied.

I, of course, got in touch with the pharmacy and they told me that he was denied because of an office of Medicaid investigation into his role in a billing scheme to defraud Medicaid. He then provided me with a letter that he had received in the mail. So we actually see, your Honor, a case where I don't have to make an argument that there could be a prejudice; there's already been a prejudice, it's something that's happened, through no fault of Mr. Cybulski. The Office of the Medicaid Inspector could not discern that Mr. Cybulski was not charged in any sort of a scheme to bill fraudulently the Medicaid unit and yet they lumped him into that part of the conspiracy. And when I actually spoke to them to try to clarify that, they said, well, he's charged with fraud, Medicaid fraud. I said, but he's not. I said, a more careful

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inspection of the indictment will show you that he's only charged in Count One.

And after I got them on the telephone and after I spent several hours with them -- excuse me my voice, I'm just getting over an illness, but after I spent several hours with them on the telephone, they then came to their senses, they rescinded that denial and they reinstated Mr. Cybulski into the New York State Medicaid program.

Now, that's something that shouldn't have happened. It's a clear example, your Honor, of a prejudice of something The argument that maybe shouldn't have happened but that did. that I read in the papers was, this is the office of Medicaid. Can you imagine what the jury will sit there and think when they're listening to this? I think, for that and for other reasons that I of course state in my motion, I think there are a lot of reasons that Mr. Cybulski will be lumped, for lack of a better term, into this conspiracy, something that he wasn't a part of. And I think it's going to be very clear that of all the evidence against him, evidence against him is a very, very small part of the total proof.

That's all I'd like to say about that.

THE COURT: Thank you very much.

I am interested in what you say about your experience with the Medicaid office, but I don't think comparing that to jurors is very fair to jurors. At least my experience with

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bureaucrats is, they have obstinacy all their own that everyday jurors, thank God, do not possess.

And getting really more to the point, while of course, there are cases where a severance should be granted, and I've done that on occasion, my own experience, over 20 years now on the bench, is that when you have someone who is not the subject of a lot of the evidence because they're charged either with fewer charges or just one aspect of a charge or whatever, that in fact it almost always redounds to their benefit, not to their detriment, and that the jury views them as kind of small fry or outsiders or add-ons and often you see acquittals in those situations.

So, it's not by any means clear to me that the fear that is expressed in these situations about someone being lumped in with the others in charges that they're not charged with, in fact, is the way that juries think. I actually think, if anything, it cuts the other way.

In any event, for basically the reasons stated by government, the motion for a severance is denied.

Now, by the way, both parties that have filed motions have asked if they can incorporate the motions of the other party; and that, of course, is fine with the Court. So, any motion made by any counsel here will be deemed to have been made by all counsel unless it either on its face is very particular to one defendant, as this particular motion is, or

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some attorney tells me they don't want to be joined in. Otherwise, I'll assume that all the motions are joined in by all defendants.

MS. LEWIS: Your Honor, can I just ask one question in that regard? I just wanted to point out that in the motions on behalf of Mr. Jakacki, we had mentioned we would want to join in motions that inure to our benefit, but specifically with severance at this time we weren't prepared to make that decision.

THE COURT: If you wanted a severance, now is the time to do it; and you didn't move for a severance, so that has been waived. That's a different question. If to the extent you join in the motion he made, I'm denying the motion for him and I am denying it for you. And I don't see what the argument would be for you in any event, but if you had a separate motion on separate grounds, that should have been filed before today. There's no reason that motion shouldn't have been made by today.

MS. LEWIS: All right. Thank you.

THE COURT: The record should reflect that

Mr. Perlmutter --

MR. PERLMUTTER: Judge, I apologize, I had this down for 4:30 and I am on CJA duty all day, so I have been down there.

THE COURT: Well, just to bring you up to speed, we've

been dealing with things that don't affect your client.

MR. PERLMUTTER: I apologize nonetheless, and I am sorry.

THE COURT: All right, no problem.

Actually, while we're on the subject that just came up, both sides asked for leave to file further motions. The answer to that is no, barring exceptional circumstances. We set this motion calendar so that everyone would give me your motions.

Now, if there's a motion that you couldn't possibly have known about because something comes up three weeks from now that was unforeseen and gives rise to a motion, of course, on that kind of motion I'll allow it. But just taking the example at hand, severance, that was a motion that could have been made and should have been made and I didn't make an exception; I said all motions should be filed. And so there is no permission granted to file additional motions. If someone believes they have a basis to file an additional motion based on exceptional or unforeseen circumstances, you can jointly convene a conference, call with the Court, and we'll determine whether to allow you to file that motion or not.

Now, turning to the bill of particulars: First, with respect to the particulars sought by defendant Cybulski, which are set forth on page 25 of his omnibus motion, with respect to Count One, he asked first for the date that Cybulski is alleged

to have become a participant in the conspiracy. That is granted, and that will also have to be provided for all, each and every one of the defendants.

He then asks for the names of who are the persons referenced as in that count as "others known and unknown." That will have to be provided as well.

He then asks for the dates Cybulski is alleged to have ceased conspiring, if any. And if there is such a date, that will have to be provided and similarly for each of the defendants.

He then asks for the specific dates and pill quantities and recipient names whereby Cybulski is alleged to have "regularly visited MW&W with multiple prescriptions, written in others' names." That is denied. That's the level of evidentiary detail that a bill of particulars is not the proper vehicle for.

Along the same lines, he's asking the same request with respect to the allegation that Mr. Cybulski "obtained oxycodone from Wieckowski or those acting at her direction even though Cybulski did not have any prescriptions." That is denied.

And, finally, all the same requests with respect to the allegation that Cybulski obtained oxycodone in his own name on occasions other than those set forth in the 2013 DEA audit, that is denied.

Turning to the bill of particulars --

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MR. KAMARAJU: Your Honor, I'm sorry, may I ask one question?

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THE COURT: Yes.

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MR. KAMARAJU: With respect to the first set of particulars that were granted, the individual referenced as others known and unknown.

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THE COURT: Yes.

of particulars to the defendants?

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MR. KAMARAJU: Obviously, as the case proceeds to trial, the government would continue to investigate. additional individuals become known, at that time, as coconspirators, would we be able to just supplement the bills

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THE COURT: Yes. But you're going to have to make a showing, if defendants object, as to why you couldn't have added those names earlier. And to put it another way, it's really critical, from the defendants' standpoint, to know who is being claimed to be their coconspirators because it invokes the hearsay exception, which is often a very major factor in cases like this. So if a week before trial you add a name and they object, you're going to have to make one hell of a showing

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that this guy was a, quote, coconspirator.

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to me as to why you didn't know sooner than a week before trial

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But with that caveat, yes, there may be names that you won't be in a position to add until later than the date we are

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about to set. The date I'm about to set for the bill of particulars will probably be in a week but we'll get to that in a second.

With respect to the bill of particulars requested by counsel for defendant Marcin Jakacki, of course, all the particulars I did grant are applied to all the defendants but now there's a request for all locations encompassed by the term "elsewhere." That is denied. There's a request for names of individuals, "by name the individuals denoted as 'others known and unknown.'" I've already granted that, and it's granted again.

With respect to paragraph 2 of Count One, "identify by name the others to whom the pills were allegedly distributed,"

I want to hear about that in a minute but I'm going to put that one on hold for a second.

With respect to Count One, paragraph 3, the first request is for the date that Mr. Jakacki became a member of the conspiracy. That's already been granted. The second is for the specific dates and amounts of each of the cash payments alleged to have been collected. That's denied.

With respect to paragraph 9 of Count One, the source of the allegation that MW&W was the leading purchaser of oxycodone tablets in its zip code between 2010 and 2012. Now, that is not a proper bill of particulars request, so it is denied under an application for a bill of particulars; however,

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I think it would be appropriate for the government to supply that information.

Any problem with that?

MR. KAMARAJU: No, your Honor, we can supply that.

THE COURT: Okay, good.

And then same thing, the name and location of the second highest. That's really less important. If the government has that and they want to supply it, I encourage them to do it. From the technical standpoint of a bill of particulars, however, it's denied.

MR. KAMARAJU: Just your Honor knows, I think what the government would supply is, there's a system known as ARCOS which contains this data and I believe there's a memorandum that summarizes that, Judge. So we'll produce that.

THE COURT: Great, terrific.

With respect to Count One, paragraph 11, "Please identify the fraudulent prescriptions," denied.

"Please identify the names of the physicians and locations of the physician offices for which the prescription forms were stolen." That is another one I want to hear a little bit more about in a second.

With respect to Count One paragraph 12, "Please identify the times, dates, locations and individuals involved and the times that the prescriptions were made out in false names," that's denied.

And also "the times, dates, locations and individuals involved and the times that Wieckowski sold oxycodone to individuals without prescriptions," that is denied.

With respect to Count One, paragraph 13 -- well, let me put it this way: I think you see, from my rulings already, how I will decide all the rest. We can go through it now if you want if you have any question about any of them but let's talk about the two that I wanted to hear argument on.

The first one was, with respect to Count One, paragraph 2, "Please identify by name the others to whom the pills were allegedly distributed," are we talking here about many people, a few people? What are we talking about?

MR. KAMARAJU: I think that the government has identified its -- it would be under ten people that the government has been able to specifically as identify having received pills. We suspect there are more but in terms of names, it would be under ten.

THE COURT: I think those should be identified. I'm going to grant that request, with the caveat that there you can supplement right up to two weeks before trial.

Similarly, with respect to Count One, paragraph 11,

"the names of the physicians and the location of the physician
offices around New York City for which prescription forms were
stolen," what are we talking about there, in terms of number?

MR. KAMARAJU: At this point, I believe the

government's identified, again, I would say under ten.

THE COURT: Okay. So same ruling: It's granted but you are free to supplement up to two weeks before trial.

MR. KAMARAJU: Okay.

THE COURT: Now, I think if you look at all the remaining ones, because this is, and quite fairly so, a detailed list going on for quite a few pages but I think my rulings make clear how I would resolve all the others. If you have any doubts about any one, you can call me jointly and I will give you a ruling over the phone.

I think we have disposed of all the motions. Yes?

MS. LEWIS: There is just one issue that was raised in the motion regarding the bill of particulars, in addition to the particulars themselves, that I think is very important in the context of defining the parameters of the allegations here; and that is, there are a lot of prescriptions that are provided and I had a call together with the government to narrow down what we're talking about here between the beginning of 2011 and June of 2013, and that's the period during which an audit was conducted on the Brooklyn and Queens pharmacies that are the subject of this indictment.

What isn't included and what I don't have any guidance as to -- and I did mention this in the motions as well -- is the prescriptions, if any, they allege are fraudulent after the time period of that audit. And I find it very troubling that

we are now in a posture where the government has kindly offered on the one hand to let us know on a rolling basis if they determine that any of these prescriptions from the Queens pharmacy after 2013 are fraudulent but that I don't know when they would provide these, we can't — it's a moving target, I don't know how we can probably make decisions and prepare for a trial without knowing if they actually do believe that any of those were fraudulent. And, similarly, they have told us —

THE COURT: So, since the government is providing that information but on a rolling basis, what you want is a cutoff date?

MS. LEWIS: I do, and I want it soon.

THE COURT: Okay. So what do you suggest as the cutoff date?

MS. LEWIS: I think, given the amount of time it will take us to do this, I think by the end of the month, if they can provide it to us within the next week or so.

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. KAMARAJU: I would just note, for the bill of particular that we just discussed, which were other individuals who received pills, which is going to capture a subset of exactly what Ms. Lewis is talking about, setting a cutoff of two weeks before trial, I would think that that's an appropriate cutoff.

THE COURT: Yes, that's what I think too. That

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doesn't mean that you shouldn't give them as much as you can immediately upon identifying it, but the list will not be definitively closed until two weeks before trial.

MR. KAMARAJU: Absolutely. The minute the government knows — and what we have just informed the Court, what we had offered to do for those prescriptions — the minute the government has identified to the government's satisfaction that a prescription is fraudulent, we will produce that exact prescription to defense counsel, so they will have a name in an unredacted form pursuant the protective order.

THE COURT: Right.

MS. LEWIS: I just have one other thing, which is, regarding the prescriptions that are -- or, I'm sorry, the drugs that don't involve a prescription, that are filled without a prescription, we have no guidance at all as to when they allege that that happened. We just have a number between 2011 -- and it's limited again -- between the beginning of 2011 and the end of the audit in 2013 in which that audit found that there were 430,000 pills that are not accounted for and, in very vague terms, they say they were ordered, there was a dispensed number, they subtract out any pills that there was a theft or stolen report made as to those pills, and then there's just the remainder of these 430,000, we don't know who's alleged to be involved with filling of these or the providing of these drugs, whether it's our clients, other people that are

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alleged, how they even allege they're related to their clients, are they on the street, are they in pharmacies. We don't know anything. And I would hope we get something more as to what their theory is there or what their allegations are.

MR. KAMARAJU: Well, I think, by definition, the allegation is that there is no identifying information for the pills that were dispensed. If there were a prescription, I could provide the prescription to defense counsel, but the point is that there are a number of pills that are not accounted for by an audit, by Lilian Jakacki, and that they are not tied to any sort of prescription. So the government is similarly in the dark with respect to where those pills went. I don't have --

THE COURT: I'm with you and I think if further information is developed, you may want to provide that, but in terms of a bill of particulars, that request is denied.

Now, I think the only thing that remains is to set a trial date. How long a trial are we talking about? Let me ask the government first.

MR. KAMARAJU: I think the government's case would be, at most, between a week and a half, maybe two weeks.

THE COURT: Is there likely to be a meaningful defense case here?

MS. LEWIS: I think we would say a week would be a reasonable assumption.

THE COURT: Okay. So I'm going to put aside three weeks, although I think that's going to be more than we need but they will be at least available.

So what dates in June and July are counsel not available?

MR. PERLMUTTER: Judge, I am gone pretty much the entire month of May, working on a CJA case out of New York.

THE COURT: Okay. Then I certainly won't start the trial before June 1st.

MR. PERLMUTTER: That would be great, that would be great. And hopefully I'll show up then; if you start at 9:00, I'll be here at 9:30 on June 1st.

THE COURT: No, I understand. So, we would not want to start the trial in early June.

MR. PERLMUTTER: That's exactly that's my main concern, Judge.

THE COURT: Okay.

MS. LEWIS: I had looked into this previously and I apologize but I'm not sure of specific dates, but Joshua Dratel, also in my office, if we did go to trial, would try the case with me. I believe that he has a trial scheduled for June and so I am not exactly sure where that falls, and I know that doesn't provide very much --

THE COURT: We've got to set the trial date today. I indicated previously that was one of the things we were going

to do today. But let me hear from final counsel.

MR. RAPAWY: June, your Honor, I have a commitment from June 6th till June 20th and then I have another commitment in July, from July 1st to the 14th, and then I would be free after the week of, I guess, July 18th.

THE COURT: Well, I'm sitting on the Ninth Circuit from July 19th through July 22nd, although the only cases they give me are ones where they're in opposition to the Second Circuit. But how about starting the trial — this will be the latest I can give you — we can start the trial on Wednesday, July 27th, and I'm free for three weeks thereafter, so how about that? Any problem with that?

MR. PERLMUTTER: Judge, on August 1st. I'm scheduled to leave with my family for a summer vacation.

THE COURT: Well, then we're going to have to find an earlier date. First of all, I cannot put this over, consistent with the Speedy Trial Act or anything else, until September because I've got a three-month trial starting in September, so this case is going to be tried before the summer is over. Now, if you want to take a few minutes and the three of you talk among yourselves, I'm willing, with exception of one or two situations, like the Ninth Circuit, where I have a problem, to try to meet whatever date you guys want to come up with. It can be June, it can be July, it can be August, but it's not going to be September or thereafter.

(Pause)

THE COURT: While you're all talking, I'm just looking at one possibility you might want to consider, which would be starting on July 6th and I don't have to go to the Ninth Circuit until I leave on July 19th, so that's only two weeks, but I'm reasonably confident, actually, this case can be tried in two weeks.

MR. PERLMUTTER: Judge, could we ask for June 20th?

THE COURT: The problem is, the only trip I have scheduled the entire summer, which is to Israel, I leave on the 25th and I will be back on July 2nd.

MR. PERLMUTTER: One second, Judge? (Pause)

THE COURT: My courtroom deputy points out that another possibility might be starting August 15th. I'm confident we'd be through by the beginning of September, when I start that other trial.

MR. RAPAWY: Your Honor, just so you know where we're thinking, I can move my June trial date -- that's a state date that can be moved -- but the July date, I'm just not going to have any flexibility.

THE COURT: Well, I'm not remembering everyone's problems, but how about starting it then sometime early in June? I can even give you parts of May, if you wanted to go that early.

1 MR. PERLMUTTER: Judge, from May 10th to May 29th, I'm 2 traveling on a CJA case. 3 THE COURT: Okay. So how about starting, say, like 4 June 6th and if we went three weeks -- there's a day here and a 5 day there I'm out of pocket but nothing major. 6 MS. LEWIS: Unfortunately, I did check with my office, 7 and Mr. Dratel's trial starts 5/31, it's an S.D.N.Y. trial and I think it's scheduled or --8 9 THE COURT: Well, I think we're back to July or 10 August. 11 MR. PERLMUTTER: Could we do August 22nd? 12 THE COURT: Let me look at that. August 22nd? Yes, 13 we can do August 22nd. 14 MS. LEWIS: I think that would be fine, your Honor, although I note that there is a bar conference at the end of 15 that week at which we have an interest in attending. 16 17 THE COURT: You know, I know that missing that 18 conference is certainly cruel and unusual punishment, but 19 anyway, if things are moving reasonably well, we can take a day 20 off here or there. 21 MS. LEWIS: It may require just one day off 22 potentially but that's fine.

MR. PERLMUTTER: Yes, Judge.

THE COURT: Okay. So we're all agreed on August 22nd

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then.

1 MR. RAPAWY: Yes. THE COURT: Great, terrific. 2 3 Pursuant to Section 3161 of Title 18, I will exclude all time between now and August 22nd, finding that such time is 4 5 necessary to accommodate the other commitments of counsel and that, for those and other reasons, the best interests of 6 7 justice in excluding such time substantially outweighs the interests of the public and the defendants in a speedy trial. 8 9 Anything else we need to take up today? 10 MR. KAMARAJU: I think your Honor was going to set a 11 schedule for the bill of particulars. 12 THE COURT: Oh, yes. So two weeks from today? 13 MR. KAMARAJU: That would be great, your Honor. 14 THE COURT: Okay, excellent. 15 All right, anything else we need to take up? MR. PERLMUTTER: No, your Honor, not from us. 16 17 THE COURT: Anything from the defense? 18 MS. LEWIS: No, your Honor. 19 MR. RAPAWY: No, your Honor. 20 THE COURT: Very good. Thanks very much. 21 MR. KAMARAJU: Thank you, your Honor. 22 (Adjourned) 23 24 25